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TITLE VII AND SENIORITY SYSTEMS: BACK TO
THE FOOT OF THE LINE?
INTRODUCTION
The "peaceful and voluntary" settlement of the persistent
problem of discrimination' was the raison d'etre of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 Title VII was to insure an aboli-
tion of "the racial and sexual caste systems which had re-
mained ingrained in the American economy since slavery and
coverture."3 Congress recognized that equal employment op-
portunity is one of the fundamental preconditions to elimina-
tion of barriers to full equality and human dignity in this so-
ciety. Therefore, not only did Congress ban discrimination in
employment practices, but it also ordered that where past dis-
crimination had prevailed, affirmative action would be appro-
priate to remedy that discrimination.' The implementation of
these affirmative action plans has enabled women5 and minori-
ties6 to achieve some initial gains toward employment equality.
In a contracting economic situation, consideration of the
necessity for worker layoffs is inevitable. Pursuant to the terms
of most collective bargaining agreements, when there is a cut-
back in employment, layoffs are based on seniority (i.e., the
length of time the worker has been employed), so that the last
person hired is the first to be fired.7 Likewise, employees who
I S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1964).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-15 (1964), as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-15 (Supp. 1972).
3 United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 921 (5th Cir. 1973).
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1964).
5 Comment, Sex Discrimination in Employment: What Has Title VII Accom-
plished for The Female, 9 RIcH. L. REV. 149 (1974).
1 Federal regulations, in placing some limitation on "minority," refer to an affirm-
ative action program's beneficiaries as "members of an 'affected class' who by virtue
of past discrimination continue to suffer the present effects of that discrimination."
41 C.F.R. § 60-2.1 (Supp. 1975). Therefore, one could have a situation where women
had been discriminated against but blacks had not, or vice versa. Thus, an affirmative
action plan would be applicable only to women in the first instance or only to blacks
in the second, provided there is a showing of present effects of that past discrimination.
Ninety percent of all collective bargaining agreements have provisions on senior-
ity. Gould, Employment Security, Seniority and Race: The Role of Title VII of the
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have been laid off are placed on a recall list and are rehired as
needed in reverse order of layoffs. Thus, the senior employee is
also the first to be reemployed. 8 Such competitive seniority
systems clash with the employment gains realized by minori-
ties and women as a result of affirmative action plans. Because
of past employment discrimination, women and minorities
have only recently begun to acquire jobs in meaningful num-
bers Yet, as the most recently hired, they are the first fired
when layoffs are ordered.
Women and minorities now argue that the progress in
achieving equal employment opportunities is being aborted by
seniority systems which are superimposed upon a history of
race and sex discrimination. Past discrimination has deprived
these groups of an opportunity to accumulate the seniority nec-
essary to protect their newly-acquired jobs and to further their
advancement." The unions, on the other hand, contend that
seniority, which establishes an objective criterion for layoff and
recall, is essential to prevent employer favoritism and arbitrary
employer decisions as to who will be laid off. The unions also
believe that workers who have invested their working efforts in
a particular job should be able to expect some guarantee of job
security."
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 How. L.J. 1, 2 (1967); Developments in the Law,
Employment Discrimination and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L.
REv. 1109, 1156 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law].
" For a general discussion of the basic premises and importance of seniority sys-
tems, see S. SUCHTER, J. HEALY, & R. LIvERNASH, THE hIPACT OF CoLLEcIvE BARGAINING
ON MANAGEMENT 104-41 (1960) [hereinafter cited as SucHTER]. For a discussion of the
role of seniority in promotions and layoffs, see Developments In the Law, supra note
7, at 1155-63.
1 The unemployment rate of blacks and other minority races fell from 8.1 percent
in 1965, the effective date of Title VII, to 6.4 percent in 1969; but in 1973, it again rose
to 8.9 percent and by early 1975 sharply increased to 13.4 percent. Stacy, Title VII
Seniority Remedies in a Time of Economic Downfall, 28 VAND. L. REV. 487, 507 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Seniority Remedies], citing U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE BLACK POPULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 1973, at 15 (1974) and Wall Street J., Feb. 10, 1975, at 3, col. 2.
10 Emotions run high on this issue. For recent public reactions to layoffs and their
effect on affirmative action, see TniE MAGAZINE, Feb. 3, 1975 at 58; Louisville Courier-
Journal & Times, Dec. 1, 1974, at Al, col. 1; Louisville Courier-Journal & Times, Nov.
17, 1974, at A12, col. 1; New York Times, March 9, 1975, § 4 at 1, col. 5.
11 The expectation of job security guaranteed by seniority may prove to be illusory
in the wake of rapid technological change. Seniority does not guarantee a job; it only
provides preferences where jobs exist. If the job is eliminated by technological innova-
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The legal question now being submitted to the courts is
"how to reconcile equal employment opportunity today with
seniority expectations based on yesterday's built-in racial dis-
crimination." 2 In analyzing the legal Gordian knot presented
by the seniority versus affirmative action controversy, the first
determination must be whether the seniority system as utilized
constitutes an unlawful employment practice within the mean-
ing of Title VII or whether the system challenged is a bona fide
seniority system outside the scope of Title VII. Secondly, if the
system is in violation of the statute, what are the acceptable
and appropriate remedies? Although sound legal reasoning
would dictate that the determination of the first issue ought to
control the second, in practice the opposite is true. The ability
or inability of the courts to find a socially and politically ac-
ceptable remedy will likely determine their findings on the
substantive issue of law.
I. UTILIZATION OF A DISCRIMINATORY SENIORITY SYSTEM. AS AN
UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE
An unlawful employment practice is a failure or refusal to
hire, a discharge or any other practice which discriminates
against any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.' 3 Any limitation, segregation, or classification of
employees which deprives any person of employment oppor-
tunities or adversely affects his or her status as an employee on
account of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin is also an
unlawful employment practice. 4 However, § 703(h) of Title
VII'5 provides an exemption for application of different terms
of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority system if such
differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate
tions, seniority is meaningless. One commentator writes: "The very concept of senior-
ity is doomed to extinction, because the economic system upon which it is based is
even now in the process of fundamental and irrevocable change." Aaron, Reflections
on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1532, 1563
(1962).
11 Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 908, 982 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
,3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)(1964).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)(1964).
J 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)(1964).
[Vol. 64
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because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."6 Al-
though only nondiscriminatory seniority systems are exempt,
Congress did not define a bona fide seniority system. Therefore,
the arduous task of determining what constitutes the bona fide
character of a seniority system has been left to the judiciary.
A. Bona Fide Seniority Systems
1. Introduction
An employment practice may be neutral on its face, in
that it does not explicitly classify employees according to race
or sex, and its implementation may not have been motivated
by a discriminatory purpose. Nevertheless, if it has a discrimi-
natory effect, it may be held to be an employment practice
prohibited by Title VII. As the Supreme Court wrote in Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 7 its first decision interpreting Title VII:
"Under the Act [Title VII], practices, procedures, or tests
neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, can-
not be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of
prior discriminatory employment practices."'" The Court held
that the absence of discriminatory intent, or even the presence
of good intent, "does not redeem employment procedures...
that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and
are unrelated to measuring job capability."' 9 Other courts have
11 42 U.S.C. § 1981 also confers a right of action against racial discrimination in
employment. Hill v. American Airlines Inc., 479 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1973); Sanders v.
Dobbs House, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971).
There is no exemption for bona fide seniority systems. Thus, there may be a separate
question as to whether seniority systems perpetuating past discrimination violate §
1981. However, the courts have tended to enforce Title VII and § 1981 together and to
impose Title VII limitations on § 1981. See Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l
Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974); Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1974);
Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974). Johnson v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974). "Legislative enactments in this area [civil
rights] have long evinced a general intent to accord parallel or overlapping remedies
against discrimination." Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1971). Sex
discrimination, however, is not covered by 42 U.S.C. § 1981, so that to deny racial
minorities relief from seniority systems under Title VII and to grant them relief only
if action were brought under § 1981 would result in women not having a remedy for
the same discriminatory action. This Comment, however, deals only with challenged
activities under Title VII.
17 401 U.S. 424 (1970).
' Id. at 430.
, Id. at 432.
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stated that it is enough that the challenged policy is followed
"deliberately, not accidentally. ' 20 This is congruent with the
objective of Title VII, which is to unshackle minorities and
women from past discrimination and to grant them relief from
that past. The statute was not enacted to punish "wrong think-
ing," but rather to compensate the victims of discrimination.
Since motivation or subjective intent in the implementa-
tion of facially neutral practices is not the determinative crite-
rion of an unlawful employment practice, one must look to the
effect of such practices. Again the Supreme Court has spoken:
"Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences
of employment practices, not simply the motivation. 2 2 Use of
the "consequences test" has led many courts to hold that the
demonstration of a statistical imbalance of female and minor-
ity employees is sufficient to create a prima facie case of dis-
crimination.3 Therefore, where neutral policies can be shown
to have a demonstrable adverse impact on minorities and
women, they are held to be violative of Title VI.21
2 Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 250 (10th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971). See also Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d
980, 996 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
22 See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 804 (4th Cir.), dismissed pur-
suant to Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Fraser, Facially Neutral Criteria and Discrimi-
nation Under Title VII: "Built-In Headwinds" or Permissible Practices?, 6 U. MICH.
J. L. REFORM 97, 101 (1972-73). Only very recently the Supreme Court held that one
need not demonstrate bad faith to be granted back pay awards upon a finding of
discriminatory practices under Title VII. The Court reasoned that:
If back pay were awardable only upon a showing of bad faith, the remedy
would become a punishment for moral turpitude, rather than a compensa-
tion for workers' injuries. This would read the "make whole" purpose right
out of Title VII, for a worker's injury is no less real simply because his
employer did not inflict it in "bad faith."
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 95 S. Ct. 2362, 2374 (1975).
2 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1970). See also Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 95 S. Ct. 2362, 2374 (1975).
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); United States v.
Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112, 120 (5th Cir. 1972); Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc.,
444 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1971); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 426
(8th Cir. 1971); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 247 (10th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971). See also Recent Developments, Civil
Rights-Employment Discrimination-Preferential Minority Treatment as an Appro-
priate Remedy Under Section 703(j) of Title VI, 42 TENN. L. REv. 397, 400 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Civil Rights].
24 Neutral systems ruled illegal under Title V11 as perpetuating effects of discrimi-
nation include: policies basing promotion on length of service where use of written tests
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2. Federal District Court Decisions
Suits attacking the use of seniority systems as the basis for
layoffs where there is an adverse impact on women and minori-
ties have met with some success at the district court level. The
district court in Watkins v. United Steel Workers of America
Local 2369,25 applying the "consequences test" to a seniority
system which was facially neutral, ruled that use of the senior-
ity system for purposes of layoffs was an unlawful employment
practice proscribed by Title VII. The court was faced with a
situation where layoffs based on employment seniority at the
once all-white company resulted in the dismissal of all blacks
hired after 1965, the effective date of Title VII. After the layoffs
only two blacks remained employed in the entire plant. Be-
cause recalls were also based on seniority, there was little
chance that the blacks who stood at the bottom of the recall
list would be rehired very soon. The court held that where there
has been a history of hiring discrimination, a plantwide senior-
ity system which perpetuates that discrimination cannot be a
bona fide seniority system protected by § 703(h). The court
reasoned that in this case, the use of a system to layoff workers
which was based on length of service was not neutral in its
effect because minorities had been precluded from accumulat-
ing enough relevant seniority to withstand layoffs. Thus, em-
ployment preferences on the basis of length of service unlaw-
fully facilitated the systematic exclusion of minorities from the
work force. 6
In enjoining use of this employment seniority system as an
unlawful employment practice, the court in Watkins relied
upon a series of cases challenging the legality of departmental
or job seniority systems" in factories which had once main-
had discriminated against blacks in hiring, Allen v. City of Mobile, 466 F.2d 122 (5th
Cir. 1972); limiting transfers to entry level jobs, United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp.,
456 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1972); system of departmental seniority, Papermakers Local 189
v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); and a
no transfer rule, Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971).
21 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974), rev'd, 44 U.S.L.W. 2045 (5th Cir., July 16,
1975).
Z Id. at 1226.
See SLICHTER, supra note 8, at 105-41. Job or departmental seniority systems
measure length of service on a particular job or in a particular department. Employ-
1975]
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tained segregated work forces.28 Without exception, these sen-
iority systems have been found to be unlawful under Title VI.L2
Employment decisions as to promotions and transfers based on
length of service on jobs or in departments from which women
and minorities had been excluded have been held to perpetuate
past discrimination. Length of service is a functional equiva-
lent of race or sex where past hiring discrimination has oc-
curred. In these cases, the seniority system, though neutral on
its face, had the "inevitable effect of tying the system to the
past" and consequently "cut into the employees' present right
not to be discriminated against on the grounds of race."3 Such
seniority systems, originating as they do in race or sex discrimi-
nation, are not bona fide systems within the proviso of § 703(h)
of Title VII.
Other district courts have employed reasoning similar to
that of Watkins. In Delay v. Carling Brewing Co.31 it was held
that where past discrimination in hiring coupled with the use
of a seniority system in layoffs resulted in a disproportionate
number of layoffs of blacks, affirmative action must be taken
to eliminate the continuing effects of that past discrimination.
ment seniority, also referred to as plantwide seniority, grants workers equal credit for
actual length of service with that employer regardless of transfers in jobs or depart-
ments.
28 These challenges generally have their origin where black employees had been
relegated to low paying jobs and later were permitted to transfer to formerly all-white
departments. Upon transferring to a new department or job, however, they lost all
seniority and were once again placed at the end of the roster. See United States v.
Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906
(1972); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971); Robinson
v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), dismissed pursuant to Rule 60, 404 U.S.
1006 (1971).
29 United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 927 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 471 F.2d 582, 593 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112, 117 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Jacksonville
Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 453 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972);
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1971); Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 795-96 (4th Cir.), dismissed pursuant to Rule 60, 404
U.S. 1006 (1971); Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 988 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Local 53, Heat and Frost Insulators v. Vogler,
407 F.2d 1047, 1054 (5th Cir. 1969); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505
(E.D. Va. 1968).
- Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 988 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
31 9 E.P.D. 9877 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
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In Loy v. City of Cleveland,2 allocating jobs according to sen-
iority would have resulted in the layoff of 87 percent of the
females compared with 42.5 percent of the males. The court
issued a restraining order enjoining the use of the seniority
system, stating that there was a "strong likelihood that the
plaintiffs will be able to show that the seniority system is based
on past discriminatory hiring and further to show that the
court's duty to affirmatively correct past discrimination would
warrant preclusion of the use of seniority."
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), the administrative agency charged with enforcement
of Title VII,34 has also held that where statistical evidence
showed that minority employees were disproportionately repre-
sented among the last-hired employees, the seniority-based
layoff system had an adverse impact on minority employees as
a class and was, therefore, an unlawful employment practice.35
EEOC analyzed the statistics of minorities in the company's
work force since 1930. Finding no significant hiring of blacks
until 1965, the Commission inferred a pattern or practice of
past discrimination.
Thus, it appears from these decisions that, in challenging
a facially neutral seniority system, it must be shown not only
that past discrimination has occurred but also that the present
effects of that discrimination are imposed upon women and
minorities through the use of the system. 6 Therefore, a senior-
ity system can be found illegal only if the employer once had a
discriminatory hiring policy.37 If the employer's business has
3' 8 F.E.P. Cas. 614, dismissed as moot, 8 F.E.P. Cas. 617 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
3 Id. at 616.
3, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(1964).
2 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRActirs GUIDE 6448 (1975) (EEOC, Decision No. 75-
251).
"' Title VII is not retroactive in the sense that it does not provide relief for victims
of pre-Act discrimination for their pre-Act injury. Title VII does prohibit, however,
practices which result in the continuance of present effects of past discrimination
including discrimination occurring before July 2, 1965, the effective date of the Act.
Robinson v. Lorillard, 444 F.2d 791, 795 (4th Cir.), dismissed pursuant to Rule 60, 404
U.S. 1006 (1971).
1' A district court refused to enjoin a layoff based on a seniority system even
though women and minorities would be disproportionately affected because the plain-
tiffs failed to show that the employer had engaged in discrimination in the past. United
Affirmative Action Comm. v. Gleason, 10 F.E.P. Cas. 64 (D.C. Ore. 1974).
19751
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always been integrated, then a seniority system would be as
beneficial to minorities and women as it is to white males. At
least one court has also required proof that the use of the chal-
lenged seniority system has resulted or will result in a dispro-
portionate percentage of minority and female workers being
laid off. 8
3. Circuit Court Decisions
Women and blacks have not fared as well in the appellate
courts. Although the bases of their decisions differ somewhat,
the three circuit courts which have ruled on the issue have
rejected the district court reasoning. In reversing Watkins, the
Fifth Circuit held that the use of a plantwide seniority system
violated neither Title VII nor 42 U.S.C. § 1981 .3 The court
distinguished the departmental seniority system cases relied
upon by the district court on the basis that the plaintiffs in-
volved in those cases were "employees who had not attained,
as individuals, their own rightful places of employment. Dis-
criminatory . . . transfer practices served as obstacles to their
gaining the employment place they would have been in, but for
prior discrimination as to them." 40 Emphasizing that the plain-
tiffs in Watkins would have to show that the past discrimi-
nation was being perpetuated against them personally, the
appellate court concluded that plaintiffs in Watkins had
already obtained their "rightful place" and, therefore, could
not claim that they personally suffered the continuing effects
of past discrimination. They were not, then, entitled to a rem-
edy.
In so holding, however, the Fifth Circuit continued to ig-
nore the evidence of the adverse impact upon blacks as a class
which results from the use of seniority systems where there has
been prior hiring discrimination.4' The court refused to apply
I In Dawkins v. Nabisco, Inc., 7 F.E.P. Cas. (N.D. Ga. 1973), the black plaintiffs-
employees failed to get an injunction against use of a plantwide seniority system. The
court, in examining the present effect of the system, found that black employees were
protected from layoffs in numbers and percentages commensurate with their represen-
tation in the plant population.
' 44 U.S.L.W. 2045 (5th Cir. July 16, 1975).
' Id. at 2046.
See Summary and Analysis, 44 U.S.L.W. 1017 (July 29, 1975) quoting the Fifth
Circuit in Watkins:
[Vol. 64
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the consequences test as set forth in Griggs. Furthermore, this
decision is impliedly contradictory to the same circuit's opinion
in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.42 In Franks, the court
found that the plaintiffs had each applied for a job, but were
unlawfully refused employment for discriminatory reasons.
Nevertheless, the court held that these plaintiffs, who had defi-
nitely been discriminated against individually, were not enti-
tled to retroactive seniority as of the date of first refusal to
hire. 3 Obviously these plaintiffs were personally suffering the
continuing effects of past discrimination and would have been
entitled to relief under the court's Watkins test.4 4 The Fifth
Circuit further failed to recognize that it is not uncommon for
courts to enjoin the perpetuation of the effects of past discrimi-
nation, even though such a remedy may benefit persons other
than those who were victims of the initial discrimination.45
In Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. IBEW4 and Waters
v. Wisconsin Steel Works of International Harvester Co.,4 the
[R]egardless of an earlier history of employment discrimination, when pres-
ent hiring practices are nondiscriminatory and have been for over 10 years,
an employer's use of a long-established seniority system for determining who
will be laid-off, and who will be rehired, adopted without intent to discrimi-
nate, is not a violation of Title VII or [42 U.S.C.] § 1981, even though the
use of the seniority system results in the discharge of more blacks than whites
to the point of eliminating blacks from the work force, where the individual
employees who suffer layoff under this system have not themselves been the
subject of prior employment discrimination.
42 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 989 (1975). Certiorari has
been granted by the Supreme Court upon petition by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund.
13 Id. at 417-18.
" For a criticism of the Franks decision, see Seniority Remedies, supra note 9, at
506.
's Cf. Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 451 (5th Cir. 1973) (minority
drivers were all granted seniority dating from time they would have qualified for
transfer, whether they applied for transfer or not. Since such a request would have been
futile, it was not made a prerequisite to recovery.); United States v. Sheet Metal
Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123, 132 (8th Cir. 1969) (The court did require proof that
each individual black had been specifically discriminated against by the union.);
EEOC v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, 311 F. Supp. 468, 474 (S.D. Ohio 1970) (Each
individual black recipient of the remedied seniority group did not have to show that
he had applied to the union, because it had a reputation for discrimination in the
community. The district court emphasized that because the Negro community had
been denied entrance, the remedy would be directed toward that minority, not simply
to the few who had formerly applied.). See Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing
Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring
and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1598 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Cooper & Sobol],
1975]
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Third and Seventh Circuits, respectively, likewise distin-
guished departmental seniority systems cases. In so doing,
these courts distinguished the departmental and job seniority
cases on the basis of the legislative history of § 703(h) rather
than on the theory that the principles invalidating those senior-
ity systems were logically inapplicable to employment seniority
cases.48 It is the opinion of these courts that, regardless of the
fact that plantwide seniority systems superimposed upon past
discrimination in hiring perpetuate that discrimination, Con-
gress intended to exempt such systems. The Third Circuit ex-
plicitly stated that it was "not fatal that a seniority system
continues the effect of past employment discrimination" and
that "this result was recognized and left undisturbed by Con-
gress in its enactment of § 703(h) and (j).,,4s
In assessing congressional intent, the Third and Seventh
Circuits cited three sources: (1) Interpretative Memorandum of
Senators Clark and Case, floor managers for Title VII in the
Senate;50 (2) Senator Clark's response to written questions
in which the authors argue that where the exclusionary practices of a company became
well known in a community, thus discouraging minorities from even applying, it would
be inappropriate to limit the class to previously refused applicants. The better ap-
proach, they suggest, is to define the scope of the affected class as all minority individ-
uals hired within a specific period. Id. at 1634-35. See also, Recent Decisions, Labor
Law-Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 947, 964 (1975)
[hereinafter citd as Recent Decisions]; Note, Last Hired, First Fired Layoffs and Title
VII, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1544 (1975). In this note, the author argues that where there has
been past discrimination, use of a plant seniority system in layoffs may operate in a
discriminatory fashion. Where this is so, the remedy of retroactive seniority should be
limited to those minority employees who are likely to have actually been in the work
force at the time of the past hiring discrimination. Id. at 1570.
46 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975).
47 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974).
48 508 F.2d 687, 712 (3d Cir. 1975) (concurring opinion of Van Dusen, J.):
Tihe basis for such distinction has been the court's view of the legislative
history of the Act, rather than any conclusion that the principles which
required modification of other seniority practices did not apply to plant
seniority. I disagree with the interpretation of the legislative history ex-
pressed in Waters . . . as well as by the majority at pp. 707-10. Id. at 712.
Id. at 706-07.
110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964):
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect is
prospective and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business has been
discriminating in the past and as a result has an all-white working force when
the title comes into effect the employer's obligation would be simply to fill
future vacancies on a nondiscriminatory basis. He would not be obliged-or
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posed by Senator Dirksen;5 ' and (3) a memorandum from the
Department of Justice presented by Senator Clark to the Sen-
ate.5 Yet, none of these documents were read on the Senate
floor, and there was no congressional discussion of their con-
tents.-3 Furthermore, these documents were introduced prior to
the introduction of the Dirksen-Mansfield Amendment, which
indeed permitted-to fire whites in order to hire Negroes, or to prefer Ne-
groes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired, to give them special
seniority rights at the expense of the white workers hired earlier. (However,
where waiting lists for employment or training are, prior to the effective date
of the title, maintained on a discriminatory basis, the use of such lists after
the title takes effect may be held to be an unlawful subterfuge to accomplish
discrimination.)
110 CONG. REC. 7217 (1974):
Question. Would the same situation prevail in respect to promotions, when
that management function is governed by a labor contract calling for promo-
tions on the basis of seniority? What of dismissals? Normally, labor contracts
call for "last hired, first fired." If the last hired are Negroes, is the employer
discriminating if his contract required that they be first fired and the re-
maining employees are white?
Answer. Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill. If under a "last
hired, first fired" agreement a Negro happens to be the "last hired", he can
still be "first fired" as long as it is done because of his status as "last hired"
and not because of his race.
Question. If an employer is directed to abolish his employment list because
of discrimination what happens to seniority?
Answer. This bill is not retroactive, and it will not require an employer to
change existing seniority lists.
"2 110 CONG. REC. 7207 (1964):
Title VII would have no effect on seniority rights existing at the time it takes
effect. If, for example, a collective bargaining contract provides that in the
event of layoffs, those who were hired last must be laid off first, such a
provision would not be affected in the least by Title VII. This would be true
even in the case where owing to discrimination prior to the effective date of
the title, white workers had more seniority than Negroes. Title VII is directed
at discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin. It is
perfectly clear that when a worker is laid off or denied a chance for promotion
because under established seniority rules he is "low man on the totem pole"
he is not being discriminated against because of his race. Of course, if the
seniority rule itself is discriminatory, it would be unlawful under Title VII.
If a rule were to state that all Negroes must be laid off before any white man,
such a rule could not serve as the basis for a discharge subsequent to the
effective date of the title. . . . But, in the ordinary case, assuming that
seniority rights were built up over a period of time during which Negroes
were not hired, these rights would not be set aside by the taking effect of
Title VII. . . . Any differences in treatment based on established seniority
rights would not be based on race and would not be forbidden by the title.
53 Cooper & Sobol, supra note 44, at 1610.
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became § 703(h), and so are not really interpretative of the
Act's qualifying language of exempting only bona fide seniority
systems.54 The only remark relating directly to § 703(h) was
Senator Hubert Humphrey's statement that the purpose of the
provision was to clarify application of the statute and not to
narrow its scope. 51
It is also important to note that an amendment to the Title
VII bill which was offered in the House and which would have
exempted all plantwide seniority systems was rejected without
debate. 6 The version of Title VII sent to the Senate by the
House made no reference to seniority systems at all.5 When the
bill returned to the House from the Senate with the Dirksen-
Mansfield Amendment attached, exempting certain bona fide
seniority systems, it was passed once more without debate on
the seniority issue." In light of the chronology of the congres-
sional statements relied on by the Third and Seventh Circuits
and the dearth of legislative history regarding § 703(h), greater
reliance should be placed on the language of the statute and
its broad purposes in interpreting the Act on questions of sen-
iority.59
" The bill was brought to the Senate floor without prior reference to any standing
committee, so that there is not even a committee report to look to as a source of
legislative history. Cooper & Sobol, supra note 44, at 1609. See also Vas, Title VII:
Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 431, 443-44 (1966); Recent Decisions,
supra note 45, at 949-50; contra Note, The Survival of Last Hired, First Fired Under
Title VII and Section 1981, 6 LoYoLA L.J. 386, 390-92 (1975).
11 "Thus this provision makes clear that it is only discrimination on account of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin, that is forbidden by the title. Then [the]
change does not narrow application of the title, but merely clarifies its present intent
and effect." EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGIsLATIvE HISTORY OF
TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964, at 3005 (1965).
"' The amendment offered by Representative Dowdy read: "The provisions of this
title shall not be applicable to any employer, whose hiring and employment practices
are pursuant to (1) a seniority system; (2) a merit system. . . ." The amendment was
rejected without debate. 110 CONG. REC. 2727, 2728 (1964) (amendment offered by
Representative Dowdy).
51 Compare the House bill (H.R. 7152) with the Senate bill after Dirksen's amend-
ment. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMISSION, LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF TITLE VII
AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3049, 3051 (1965).
5, But see 110 CONG. REC. 15893 (1964) (remarks of Representative McCulloch).
The paucity of legislative history on the meaning of a bona fide seniority system
is crucial for another reason. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed
an amicus brief with the Fifth Circuit in support of the district court's holding in
Watkins. EEOC argued that an employment seniority system which perpetuates the
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Both the Third and Seventh Circuits believe, however,
that Congress chose to permit plantwide seniority systems, de-
spite their disproportionate adverse effect on minorities and
women, to avoid upsetting all collective bargaining agreements
with "last hired, first fired" provisions. Their interpretation
was that "Congress did not intend the chaotic consequences
that would result from declaring unlawful all seniority systems
which may disadvantage females and minority group per-
sons." These courts presumed that Congress was concerned
not with the disparate effect of such systems on the employ-
ment opportunities of the persons for whom Title VII was en-
acted, but rather with the effect a remedy of such discrimina-
tory practices would have on white male employees. The Sev-
enth Circuit's holding that an employment seniority system
was not discriminatory showed that its real concern was for the
effect a contrary holding would have on white employees:
An employment seniority system embodying the "last hired,
first fired" principle does not of itself perpetuate past dis-
crimination. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to
shackling white employees with a burden of a past discrimi-
nation created not by them but by their employer."
Ultimately, then, in these two circuits the distinction between
the test for a bona fide seniority system as applied to depart-
mental seniority and that applied to plantwide seniority lies in
the action necessary to remedy the present discriminatory ef-
effects of past discrimination is not bona fide within the meaning of § 703(h). D. Stacy,
Regional Counsel for EEOC, discusses the EEOC amicus brief in his article Seniority
Remedies, supra note 9, at 512-13.
Currently EEOC is also in the process of adopting guidelines on layoff. 88 L.R.R.
216 (1975). Once these guidelines are adopted by EEOC, which is charged with the
administration of Title VII, they will be "entitled to great deference" by the courts.
See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 433 (1970). The effect is that the party challenging the guidelines "must show
not just that its reading [of the statute] is the more plausible, but rather that the
agency's reading clearly contravenes the legislative history." Seniority Remedies,
supra note 9, at 516. Thus, the position of women and minorities in challenging plant-
wide seniority systems engrafted upon past discrimination would be strengthened
greatly and the importance of Waters, Jersey Central, and Watkins would be dimin-
ished if EEOC were to adopt guidelines along the same vein as its amicus brief in
Watkins.
cl Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, 508 F.2d 687, 708 (3d Cir. 1975).
" Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309, 1320 (7th
Cir. 1974).
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fects.12 The courts rationalized that the only remedy for dis-
criminatory effects caused by use of plantwide seniority sys-
tems in layoffs would be fictional seniority and that the grant-
ing of such a remedy would constitute "preferential treatment"
prohibited by § 703(j) of Title VII.
The remedying of present effects of past discrimination,
12 Both appellate courts adopted the reasoning of Papermakers Local 189 v.
United States, 416 F.2d 980, 994-95 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970),
which stated:
No doubt, Congress, to prevent "reverse discrimination" meant to protect
certain seniority rights that could not have existed but for previous racial
discrimination. For example a Negro who had been rejected by an employer
on racial grounds before passage of the Act could not, after being hired, claim
to outrank whites who had been hired before him but after his original
rejection, even though the Negro might have had senior status but for the
past discrimination. As the Court pointed out in Quarles, the treatment of
"job" or "department seniority" raises problems different from those dis-
cussed in the Senate debates: "a department seniority system that has its
genesis in racial discrimination is not a bona fide seniority system." 279 F.
Supp. at 517.
It is one thing for legislation to require the creation of fictional seniority for
newly hired Negroes, and quite another thing for it to require that time
actually worked in Negro jobs be given equal status with time worked in
white jobs. To begin with, requiring employers to correct their pre-Act dis-
crimination by creating fictional seniority for new Negro employees would
not necessarily aid the actual victims of the previous discrimination. There
would be no guaranty that the new employees had actually suffered exclu-
sion at the hands of the employer in the past, or, if they had, there would
be no way of knowing whether, after being hired, they would have continued
to work for the same employer. In other words, creating fictional employment
time for newly-hired Negroes would comprise preferential rather than reme-
dial treatment. The clear thrust of the Senate debate is directed against such
preferential treatment on the basis of race.
We conclude, in agreement with Quarles, that Congress exempted from the
anti-discrimination requirements only those seniority rights that gave white
workers preference over junior Negroes. This is not to say that Whitfield and
Quarles and Title VII prohibit an employer from giving compensatory train-
ing and help to the Negro workers who have been discriminated against.
Title VII's imposition of an affirmative duty on employers to undo past
discrimination permits compensatory action for those who have suffered
from prior discrimination.
See also Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, 508 F.2d 687 (3rd Cir. 1975); Waters
v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309, 1319 (7th Cir. 1974);
Franks v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 495 F.2d 398, 417 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420
U.S. 989 (1975).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1964).
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however, is not "preferential treatment."64 The courts' ap-
proach obviously presupposed that the challenged seniority
systems were bona fide, for if the systems were discriminatory,
the relief granted would not be "preferential treatment." More-
over, the courts unimaginatively assumed that fictional
seniority is the sole remedy. Thus, the consideration of reme-
dies controls the decision on the substantive issue, and the
courts have circumvented the direct question of whether em-
ployment seniority systems which continue the effects of past
discrimination are violative of Title VII.
Through this approach, the courts have ignored the actual
consequences of the utilization of seniority systems on the em-
ployment opportunities of minorities and women, thereby se-
verely diluting the remedial effect of Title VII. The overall
purpose of Title VII is "to achieve equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the
past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees."65 Congress has required the "removal of arti-
ficial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when
the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of
racial or other impermissible classification."66 Using length of
service as the criterion for retaining employment where women
and minorities have been previously denied employment, is
utilizing a functional equivalent of race or sex to deprive minor-
ities and women of employment and to benefit an "identifiable
group of white employees." Such a seniority system should not
be regarded as a bona fide seniority system because it allows
an employer to do in firing what he could not do in hiring:
consistently and systematically deny employment on the basis
of sex and race. Seniority systems superimposed upon discrimi-
nation in hiring create differences in treatment which are the
direct result of prior intentional exclusion of women and minor-
ities and, as such, are not within the exemption set forth in §
703(h) .67
11 See United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408, 413
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.,
431 F.2d 245, 250 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971); United States v.
Local 38, IBEW, 428 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1970).
c Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1970).
" Id. at 431.
" The impetus of § 703(h) could be maintained and congressional intent satisfied
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B. Business Necessity
Even if it is demonstrated that the use of an employment
seniority system perpetuates discrimination against women
and minorities, the system may be validated by the courts
upon a showing by the employer that the system is indispens-
able to "an overriding legitimate, non-racial business pur-
pose."68 Where there is a facially neutral employment practice
with discriminatory results, the practice is prohibited if it can-
not be shown to be business related. "The touchstone is busi-
ness necessity."69 To comply with the business necessity test,
an otherwise illegal seniority system must be proven to have a
"manifest relationship to the employment in question. ' 70 The
challenged practice must be "necessary to the safe and efficient
operation of business, ' 71 and it must be sufficiently compelling,
in that "there must be available no acceptable alternative poli-
cies or practices which would better accomplish the business
purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser
differential racial impact. ' 72 The burden is on the party sup-
porting the practice to prove its business necessity. 73
In the departmental seniority cases, the courts have con-
sistently rejected the argument that the need for experienced
by interpreting this section to validate all seniority systems except those which perpet-
uate differences in treatment which have resulted from actual intent to discriminate.
When there has been no history of discriminatory hiring practices, there could not be
a successful challenge to the bona fide character of the seniority system in question.
Recent Decisions, supra note 45, at 960. Cf. Cooper & Sobol, supra note 44, at 1613.
68 Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 989 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
61 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1970).
70 Id. at 432.
71 Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 415 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted,
420 U.S. 989 (1975); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, 431 F.2d 245, 249 (10th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971).
11 Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 879 (6th Cir. 1973); Robinson
v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), dismissed pursuant to Rule 60, 404 U.S.
1006 (1971); See also Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974).
13 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 (1970). It should be noted that
where sex discrimination is involved an employer may have an additional statutory
defense under the "bona fide occupational qualification" exemption of § 703(e) of Title
VII. For a thorough discussion of the difference between "BFOQ" defenses and busi-
ness necessity, see B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEx DIscRIMINA-
TION AND THE LAW 348-49 (1975).
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workers constitutes a business necessity. 4 Certainly in cases of
layoff and recall, seniority systems should not stand as being
essential to a legitimate, nonracial,'nonsexist business purpose.
In these cases, workers are not attempting to get new jobs but
rather to keep the jobs for which they are already implicitly
qualified. Seniority is, according to one court, "an inefficient
means of assuring sufficient prior job experience."7 5 Layoffs
based on seniority are based only on length of service, not abil-
ity.7" Though the employer might argue that retention of the
more experienced workers is a legitimate concern, that concern
or interest is not so compelling that the seniority system should
be upheld despite its perpetuation of sex and race discrimina-
tion. Nor has the threat of "[labor unrest stemming from
interference with the expectations of whites" been held to con-
stitute a business necessity.77 Thus, it appears that it is partic-
ularly difficult to justify a seniority system in terms of business
necessity.
II. THE REMEDIES FOR AN UNLAWFUL SENIORITY SYSTEM
A. Scope of Remedies Under Title VII
Once it is determined that discrimination has occurred
and is continued by an unlawful employment practice, the
problem of developing an appropriate remedy must be met.
Section 706(g) of Title VII7 provides that the court may enjoin
an unlawful employment practice and order affirmative action
11 See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), dismissed pur-
suant to Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F.2d
1038 (5th Cir. 1969).
11 Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 (4th Cir.), dismissed pursuant
to Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
71 United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 366 (8th Cir. 1973). See also
Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309, 1321 (7th Cir.
1974).
7 Rodriquez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 57-58 n.22 (5th Cir. 1974).
7R If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in, or
is intentionally engaging in, the unlawful employment practice charged in
the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such
unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or
hiring of employees, with or without back pay . . . or any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate. ...
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964).
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where necessary upon the court's finding that the respondent
has intentionally engaged in, or is now intentionally engaging
in, an unlawful employment practice. 9 By enactment of this
provision, Congress intended to grant the courts wide discre-
tion in exercising their equitable powers to fashion the "most
complete relief possible.""0 Thus, the courts are not limited to
simply "parroting the Act's prohibition but are permitted, if
not required, to order such affirmative action as may be appro-
priate.""s The courts, in administering equitable relief pur-
suant to a statute, must responsibly exercise "official con-
science on all the facts of a particular situation in the light of
the purpose for which the power exists." 2 Therefore, the objec-
tive of Title VII, i.e., the elimination of all vestiges of race and
sex discrimination, must at all times be uppermost in the
minds of the decision-makers.
Three approaches to fashioning an adequate remedy
against seniority systems which have discriminatory effects
have been suggested in the cases involving departmental sen-
iority: "status quo," "rightful place," and "freedom now. '8 3
The "status quo" approach would support the continued use
of a seniority system which was not facially discriminatory and
would not require a remedy for present effects of past discrimi-
nation so long as present explicit discrimination had ended.
This theory has been continually rejected by the courts which
have preferred to use the "rightful place" approach. 4 This lat-
11 "Intentionally engaging in" simply means that "[a]lthough the company did
not adopt the policy with the intention of discriminating, the practice was followed
deliberately, not accidently." Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 250
(10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971). See text accompanying note 21
supra for a discussion of the element of intent under Title VII.
50 118 CONG. REC. 7168 (1972) (Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972-Conference Report).
"' Local 53, Heat and Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.
1969). See also Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 451 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1971).
2 Bowles v. Goebel, 151 F.2d 671, 674 (8th Cir. 1945).
1 The three approaches were first fully developed in Note, Title VII, Seniority
Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1260, 1268 (1967).
[hereinafter cited as Note]. See also Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416
F.2d 980, 988 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). On the inadequacy of
these approaches, see A. BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW 200, 202 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as BLUMROSEN].
"' Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 415 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted,
420 U.S. 989 (1975); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir.
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ter remedial approach proscribes the awarding of future vacant
jobs on the basis of job or departmental seniority which "locks
in" prior discrimination caused by former segregation. The ef-
fect of the "rightful place" approach in those cases was to base
promotions and transfers to new jobs within the plant upon
employment seniority rather than departmental seniority.
85
Although such a remedy is appropriate in cases of promotion
and transfer, the granting of plantwide seniority where layoffs
are imminent is of no help because the "plantwide seniority
system is the instrument perpetuating the discrimination."86
Obviously, it would not serve as a remedy in such cases.
The only viable approach in cases challenging use of plant-
wide seniority systems is "freedom now." This remedy requires
a total purge of the "but-for" effects of past discrimination.87
As the Supreme Court has stated, "the court has not merely
the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as
possible remedy the discriminatory effects of the past as well
as bar like discrimination in the future."' In compensating for
past discrimination, the courts are to make "whole" those who
suffered from the past discrimination and eliminate its effects
as far as possible.89 Congress has also recognized that the ac-
complishment of this objective
... rests not only upon the elimination of the particular
unlawful employment practice complained of, but also re-
quires that persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects
of the unlawful employment practice be, so far as possible,
restored to a position where they would have been were it not
for the unlawful discrimination."
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446
F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), dismissed
pursuant to Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Papermakers Local 189 v: United States,
416 F.2d 980, 988 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
" See cases cited in note 84 supra.
" Comment, The Inevitable Interplay of Title VII and the National Labor Rela-
tions Act: A New Role for the NLRB, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 158, 166 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Comment].
" Note, supra note 83, at 1268-69.
" Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
" Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 451 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1971); Bowe v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 721 (7th Cir. 1969).
11 118 CONG. REc. 7168 (1972), supra note 80 (emphasis added).
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Thus, an adequate and appropriate remedy where minorities
and women have been prohibited from obtaining jobs due to
discriminatory hiring practices is one which will put them in
the positions they would have occupied but for the discrimina-
tion.
The relief granted, however, may not go so far as to consti-
tute "preferential treatment" banned by § 703(j) . Literally
construed, this section prohibits the application of an absolute
hiring quota reflecting the percentage of minorities and women
within the population at large.12 The prohibition against "pref-
erential treatment" does not preclude affirmative action
against facially neutral practices which perpetuate the adverse
effects of past discrimination. Stated differently, "[p]resent
correction of past discrimination is not preferential treat-
ment. 9 3 In fact, Congress has mandated the "removal of artifi-
cial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to employment when
the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of
racial or other impermissible classifications[s]." 4 As the
Sixth Circuit has stated:
When the stated purposes of the Act and the broad affirma-
tive relief authorization ... are read in context with § 2000e-
2(j), we believe that section cannot be construed as a ban on
9, Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require any
employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-
management committee subject to this title to grant preferential treatment
to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex or
national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which
may exist with respect to the total number or percentages of persons of any
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer, re-
ferred or classified for employment by any employment agency or labor
organization . . . in comparison with the total number or percentage of
persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community,
state, section or other area, or in the available work force in any community,
state, section or other area.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j)(1972).
9 Comment, supra note 86.
"' Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 250 (10th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971). See also United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d
544 (9th Cir. 1971); Contractors' Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.
1971); Local 53, Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969). As
the court in Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (E.D. Va. 1968) wrote:
"Congress did not intend to freeze an entire generation of Negro employees into dis-
criminatory patterns that existed before the act."
11 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1970).
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affirmative relief against continuation of effects of past dis-
crimination resulting from present practices (neutral on their.
face) which have the practical effect of continuing past injus-
tices.
Any other interpretation would allow complete nullifica-
tion of the stated purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.11
Therefore, where the courts find that the use of length of
service as the determining factor in layoffs perpetuates past
discrimination, thus constituting an unlawful employment
practice, and that some other system which will not have such
a severe adverse impact on women and minorities should be
created to allocate jobs, women and minorities are entitled to
relief from that unlawful employment practice. Such relief, in
whatever form, is not "preferential treatment" but simply a
remedy prescribed by Title V'II.6 The courts in Waters,97
Watkins,"5 and Jersey Central Power & Light Co.99 failed to
recognize this fact. The courts in those cases determined that
use of employment seniority in layoffs, even though it may
perpetuate past discrimination and have a grossly unequal ef-
fect on minorities and women, is not violative of Title VII based
on the assumption that the only remedy available for an unlaw-
ful system is "fictional seniority." Such a remedy, according to
those courts, is preferential treatment proscribed by § 703(j).
This would appear to be circular reasoning, for if the courts had
first decided the substantive issue and determined that utiliza-
tion of seniority to allocate jobs in a layoff situation is an un-
lawful employment practice, they would then have had "wide
discretion" in ordering a remedy which would grant the "most
complete relief possible"'' ° to female and minority employees.
"Fictional seniority," if used as a remedy for past illegal dis-
crimination, would not then constitute "preferential treat-
ment." Yet, the courts, in erroneously assuming that "fictional
seniority" is the only remedy, allowed their abhorrence of such
' United States v. Local 38, IBEW, 428 F.2d 144, 149-50 (6th Cir. 1970).
" Cf. Slate, Preferential Relief in Employment Discrimination Cases, 5 LoyOLA
L.J. 315 (1974).
11 Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir.
1974).
' Watkins v. Steel Workers Local 2369, 44 U.S.L.W. 2045 (5th Cir. July 16, 1975).
" Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975).
118 CONG. REC. 7168, supra note 80.
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relief to determine their decision of the substantive issue. They
never reached the point of examining the full scope of remedies
available to rectify the discriminatory acts.
B. Alternative Remedies
1. Employer Responsibility
An appropriate remedy, as discussed above, must be one
which will both undo the results of past discrimination and
prevent future inequities."' In selecting the type of relief to be
granted, it is essential not to view the problem simply as one
of balancing the competing interests of minorities and women
against those of white male workers. Such an analysis fails to
include the employer, who must assume the ultimate responsi-
bility for the initial discrimination in hiring. The erroneous use
of the proverbial balancing test in this situation not only dis-
torts the legal problem but also limits the scope of remedies by
ignoring the possibility of damages from the employer as an
appropriate remedy.
1
1
2
Damages in lump sum payments could be awarded to the
members of the discriminated class at the rate they would now
be earning but for the discrimination. ' This would place the
impact of the burden of protecting the equal opportunity rights
of women and minorities on the employer, rather than on other
workers. In a very recent decision, the Supreme Court reem-
phasized the remedy of awarding damages to victims of unlaw-
"I, See Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d 1038, 1047 (3d Cir.), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 970 (1973), reinstated, 497 F.2d 403 (3d Cir.
1974).
0I Alfred Blumrosen, former Director of Compliance for the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, has made such a suggestion:
New attention to the damage remedy in seniority cases is now required
because Title VII . . . creates a federal cause of action for employment
discrimination. Under the Title, the federal courts may award all appropri-
ate relief, including both specific performance and damages.
The ideas of employer responsibilities and the damage remedy converge
with the traditional idea of reform of seniority systems to suggest a compre-
hensive remedy for discriminatory seniority arrangements. This remedy
would include both reform of the system to increase minority employment
opportunities and a species of damage remedy to cover those losses which
may not appropriately be dealt with by specific performance.
BLUMROSEN, supra note 83, at 159-60.
103 Cooper & Sobol, supra note 45, at 1679; Note, supra note 83, at 1281-82.
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ful employment discrimination in order to make them "whole"
under Title VII. °4 Once there has been a finding of unlawful
discrimination, wrote the Court, "backpay should be denied
only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate
the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination
throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries
suffered through past discrimination." ' 5
It has been suggested that employers, with the cooperation
of the government and labor, could develop a special fund to
assist displaced workers and reimburse for loss of earnings "ar-
ising out of the need to meet current demands of social jus-
tice."'0 6 This "Equal Opportunity Fund" could be modeled on
the "automation funds" which were accumulated to assist
workers who were displaced by new automated equipment.1
7
Furthermore, where layoffs will have a disparate effect on
women and blacks due to the use of seniority systems, the
burden should be on the employer to avoid layoffs if at all
possible. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is
considering proposals that employers should be required to
show that there is a business necessity requiring layoffs if those
layoffs would have an adverse impact on minorities and
women.' 9 Use of the business necessity test would place a bur-
den upon the employer to show that there is no reasonable
alternative to such layoffs. Some cost-cutting measures which
an employer might use to avoid layoffs include eliminating
overtime or shutting down plants one day a week without cut-
ting salaries.' 9 Employers might also encourage "early-out"
retirement programs on a voluntary basis. Use of such "inverse
seniority" would allow older workers near the retirement age to
retire with the benefit of pensions and Social Security."10
,"I Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 95 S. Ct. 2362 (1975).
,c Id. at 2373.
, BLurMOSEN, supra note 83, at 208-11.
' Id. at 209.
IC The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is currently developing
guidelines for employers as to what action they should take before beginning layoffs
which will have a differential impact on women and minorities. 88 L.R.R. 216 (1975).
'9 Hyatt, The Recession and Jobs, 1 WOMEN'S L. REP. 215, 216 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Hyatt].
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2. Date-of-Application Seniority
Retroactive seniority has been recognized by the courts"'
as a necessary element of compensation for individuals who
have applied for but been illegally denied employment on the
basis of race or sex since the effective date of Title VII. '" 2 The
seniority is awarded as of the date of the prior application.
13
In addition, unit or job seniority has been held to date from the
time an employee qualified for the job even though that person
had not made an application for a transfer to the white-only
unit. In so holding, one court recognized that some employees,
being aware of the prevailing discriminatory hiring practice,
had not bothered to apply.I" A few may have had "the courage
to fight 'the system', but it is equally certain that others must
have been intimidated and discouraged by [the company's]
discriminatory practices.' '
5
The courts have granted retroactive seniority to women
and minorities but only if they had applied prior to the elimi-
nation of the discriminatory hiring practice. For instance, the
Third Circuit in Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co."' granted
retroactive seniority to women who applied for jobs but had
been refused employment solely because of their sex. The sen-
iority was to attach as of the date of the unlawful practice, i.e.,
the date the women were denied the positions. In so doing, the
court recognized its "duty to grant relief which so far as possi-
ble eliminates effects of the past as well as bars like discrimina-
tion in the future.""' 7 Yet, in Jersey Central Power & Light
110 Id. See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 45, at 1636. One agricultural manufacturer,
Deere & Co., has already worked out such a plan on a voluntary basis with some
success. TmnE, Feb. 3, 1975, at 58.
M Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 489 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1973); Jurinko v. Edwin
L. Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d 1038 (3d Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414
U.S. 970 (1973), reinstated, 497 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Georgia Power
Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 7
E.P.D. 9066 (W.D. Olda. 1973); Hester v. Southern Ry., 349 F. Supp. 812 (W.D. Ga.
1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 497 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1974).
112 Title VII became effective on July 2, 1975. See § 716 of Pub. L. 88-352.
"' United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973); Bowe v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
B2 Ring v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1973).
", Id. at 451.
116 477 F.2d 1038 (3d Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 970
(1973), reinstated, 497 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1974).
"I Id. at 1046.
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Co.,"' the same court found that the granting of fictional sen-
iority as relief from a seniority system perpetuating past dis-
crimination would constitute "preferential treatment" banned
by Title VII.
The Sixth Circuit, in Meadows v. Ford Motor Co.,"9 was
hesitant to grant retroactive competitive seniority' 21 to women
who had proven hiring discrimination because of the possible
adverse effect such relief would have on other workers. How-
ever, the court did instruct the district court that retroactive
seniority is not proscribed by the § 703(j) prohibition against
preferential treatment. This issue is now before the Supreme
Court in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.121 In Franks,
the Fifth Circuit refused to grant date-of-application seniority
even though it found that the particular individuals before it
had been personally denied a job due to their race. Such a
holding precludes full remedy for an injury inflicted after the
effective date of Title VII.'1
3. Modification of Collective Bargaining Agreements
Where mass layoffs have occurred or are imminent and the
use of the "last hired, first fired" policy will have a dispropor-
tionately adverse effect on the minority employees recently
hired pursuant to affirmative action, the burden of a remedy
may have to shift somewhat to workers who have not suffered
discrimination. Therefore, even though the collective bargain-
ing agreement may mandate the use of seniority systems in
11 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1974).
"' 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975).
Competitive seniority systems determine the relations of employees to each
other and establish an internal ranking among union members in the event of promo-
tion, transfer, "bumps," or layoffs. Benefit seniority, however, is used to determine
vacations, pensions, parking privileges, and other such interests. Since the latter in-
volved only the relation between the employee and the employer, the court did not
hesitate to grant retroactive benefit seniority. Id. at 949.
121 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 989 (1975).
" The brief for EEOC as amicus curiae at 12, Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 510
F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975) reasons that:
...if seniority is not adjusted to the date these women would have been
hired, they will continuously suffer from less job security and poorer upward
mobility than those men who filed applications at the same time and were
hired, merely because they were prevented from commencing employment
and accumulating seniority by Ford's discriminatory weight requirements.
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layoffs, the courts may modify these agreements to prevent the
continuing effects of past discrimination. 2 ' The interests of
workers in seniority are "not indefeasibly vested rights but
mere expectations derived from a bargaining agreement sub-
ject to modification. 1 2 Although circumvention of the senior-
ity system during layoffs may frustrate the expectations of
white male employees,
• . . Title VII guarantees that all employees are entitled to
the same expectations regardless of "race, color, religion, sex
or national origin." Where some employees now have lower
expectations than their coworkers because of the influence of
one of these forbidden factors, they are entitled to have their
expectations raised even if the expectations of others must be
lowered in order to achieve the statutorily mandated equality
of opportunity.In
The fact is that where there has been a history of discrimi-
natory hiring against women and minorities, the seniority ex-
pectations of white male workers are grounded in that unlawful
discrimination. When seniority provisions are modified, the
"white employees will fare no worse as a result of the proposed
remedies than they would had [the employer] hired women
and blacks on a fair basis throughout the years. 1 2 After all,
white male employees have benefitted from the discrimination
because more jobs have been available for them in the past due
to discriminatory policies. It is necessary for them to under-
stand that, in essence, they "suffer no inequity by being de-
prived only of that which they received as a consequence of
discrimination."' If relief under Title VII is denied simply
because white males "who have not suffered discrimination
will be unhappy, then there is little hope of correcting the
"2 Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 451 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Jack-
sonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972);
Local 53, Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
121 Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 520 (E.D. Va. 1968); cf.
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
"I Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 800 (4th Cir.), dismissed pursuant
to Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
2I Watkins v. Steel Workers Local 2369, 369 F. Supp. 1221, 1230 n.7 (E.D. La.
1974), rev'd, 44 U.S.L.W. 2045 (5th Cir. July 16, 1975).
'"' United States v. Roadway Express, Inc., 457 F.2d 854, 856 (6th Cir. 1972).
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wrongs to which the Act is directed."' s It must also be recog-
nized that the unions themselves have often discriminated
against women and blacks, and that they too have played an
important role in excluding these groups from employment or,
at least, in relegating them to inferior jobs.' 21 Whether or not
the union has so discriminated in the past ought to be consid-
ered by the courts in shaping a remedy. This is not to say that
the reaction of workers to modification of bargaining agree-
ments merits no consideration. It is simply necessary to point
out that those workers who are not former victims of discrimi-
nation must recognize that they too share in the responsibility
of rectifying past inequities which continue to affect those who
have been victims of discrimination.
Perhaps the most equitable and acceptable method of allo-
cating jobs when an employer has no other alternative for cut-
ting costs is a forced worksharing plan. This kind of plan is not
a new concept. Ninety percent of the collective bargaining
agreements in the apparel industries have worksharing clauses
in lieu of clauses providing for layoff procedures.' 0 Such plans
reduce the work week or adopt a rotational system of workshar-
ing.'3' Some unions, however, argue that the "share-the-work"
principle is simply shared misery and that short work weeks
provide little more remuneration than state unemployment
benefits augmented by negotiated supplementary benefits.
1
1
32
The AFL-CIO has suggested a 35-hour work week to help pre-
serve the number of jobs.'33 Costs may also be reduced by elimi-
nating paid holidays.
Where worksharing plans are unacceptable and layoffs are
unavoidable, one solution which would insure the continued
representation of minorities and women in the work force is to
' United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 663 (2d Cir. 1971).
in Cf. Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); United States
v. Local 212, IBEW, 472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Int'l Longshore-
man's Ass'n, 460 F.2d 497 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1007 (1972); United
States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971). See also Note, The Civil
Rights Act of 1964: Racial Discrimination by Labor Unions, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 59
(1966).
' SLICHTER, supra note 8, at 104-54.
,3, Id. at 152.
132 Id.
11 Hyatt, supra note 109, at 217.
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apportion layoffs among white men, minorities, and women on
the basis of the proportion of each group within the work force
of that employer. '34 Individuals in each group could be laid off
according to their seniority in that group, thus retaining an
objective standard which precludes an employer from making
arbitrary decisions as to who goes and who stays. In this way,
the burden of present adverse conditions is placed on all in an
"aliquot fashion," and the proportion of minority and female
employees in the work force will be protected. 13 5
4. Experimental Decrees
There may be many more possibilities which would be
more equitable and effective. Each possibility should be exam-
ined carefully with the goal of developing an alternative to
discriminatory seniority systems which is least harmful to the
employment interests of all workers. This goal may be best met
by the courts through the issuance of experimental decrees' 3
,"I Loy v. City of Cleveland, 8 F.E.P. Cas. 614 (N.D. Ohio, filed March 29, 1974),
dismissed as moot, 8 F.E.P. Cas. 617 (N.D. Ohio 1974). See N.Y. Times, March 9,
1975, § 3, at 1, col. 1; id., § 1, at 1, col. 1.
"I This alternative would not violate § 7030) which prohibits absolute quotas
based on race or sex intended to reflect the percentage of each in the population at
large. Where there are present effects of past discrimination being perpetuated and the
courts have found an employment practice to be unlawful, numerical goals have been
upheld by eight circuits as a legitimate remedy. See United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc.,
479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Local 212, IBEW, 472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir.
1973); United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972);
United States v. Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1972); Carter v. Gal-
lagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d
544 (9th Cir. 1971); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.
1971); Local 53, Heat and Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969). See
Civil Rights, supra note 23, at 400. When Congress amended Title VII in 1972, it
specifically rejected proposals which would have prohibited this form of remedy. 118
CONG. REc. 1662-76 (1972). See also Recent Decisions, supra note 45, at 968, n.149.
"I See Sedler, Conditional, Experimental and Substitutional Relief, 16 RuTGERs
L. REV. 639, 716 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Sedler]. The benefits of the use of
experimental decrees are more clearly expounded by Professor Sedler:
Practical considerations may militate against giving full or immediate pro-
tection to the plaintiff's interest. When a court attempts to make this adjust-
ment, it is said that it is administering experimental relief-it attempts to
secure the interests of both parties, realizing that it may have to make
further modifications if the results do not accord with the prediction; in some
instances the results cannot be fully predicted at the time of the decree.
Experimental relief benefits both the plaintiff and the defendant. It enables
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similar to that issued by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board
of Education,137 which ordered desegregation of schools "with
all deliberate speed." Such a decree is flexible, declaring what
must or must not be done but reserving the means of perform-
ance to the defendant's discretion after consultation with the
plaintiff. By issuing experimental decrees,
the court attempts to secure to both parties whatever benefits
they are entitled to receive under a particular transaction.
The decrees in these cases are referred to as experimental
because of their underlying purpose-to secure benefits to
one party without destroying the legitimate interests of the
other. In some instances the decree may also have to be modi-
fied if the anticipated results are not achieved. 3
Experimental decrees place the responsibility of developing an
acceptable, viable remedy upon the parties involved-women,
minorities, unions, and employers. An administrator or master
could be appointed to guide the negotiations in the shaping of
a remedy and to monitor its implementation.13
The advantages of the experimental decree in this type of
case are obvious. Instead of forcing upon the parties a remedy
which the court may have developed too quickly and without
the benefit of expertise in the field of labor relations, this kind
of decree compels the parties themselves to sit down together
and work out their differences. This approach avoids creating
resentment and possible labor strife, for the remedy recom-
mended by the parties involved will be the one most readily
accepted and least resisted by them.
the defendant to satisfy the duty the court finds owing, but at the same time
to minimize the adverse effect on his interests. It enables the plaintiff to
obtain some measure of relief, when otherwise any relief might have to be
refused due to hardship, impracticability or the like.
Id.
137 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1954):
In fashioning and effectuating the decrees the courts will be guided by equi-
table principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical
flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconcil-
ing public and private needs. These cases call for the exercise of these
traditional attributes of equity power.
i Sedler, supra note 136, at 725.
' See Harris, The Title VII Administrator: A Case Study in Judicial Flexibility,
70 CORNELL L. REV. 53 (1974).
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CONCLUSION
The most desirable answer to the entire problem of con-
flicts between seniority systems and affirmative action plans is
to prevent the conflicts from the beginning at the bargaining
table.' An agreement should be forged which includes a means
of allocating jobs during layoffs other than by length of service
or other criteria which result in the continuation of past dis-
crimination. Once the courts have held that employment sen-
iority is not a bona fide seniority system when it is superim-
posed upon past discriminatory hiring practices, it is likely
that employers and unions will be more willing and sincere in
their efforts to reach an agreement acceptable to minority and
women employees. Another method of avoiding the problem of
mass layoffs of female and minority employees is for employers
to develop affirmative action plans insuring the assignment,
training, and promotion of blacks and women to job classifica-
tions less sensitive to fluctuating economic conditions and thus
less susceptible to layoffs.'
It has also been suggested that the procedural structure set
forth in the National Labor Relations Act for dealing with cer-
tification and unfair labor practice cases could be used to pre-
vent discrimination before it occurs or is brought to court.4 2
Lastly, arbitration might be utilized to deal with seniority sys-
tems proven to have a discriminatory impact. The advantage
of these approaches is the preservation of labor peace by en-
couraging negotiation and compromise instead of forcing the
imposition of a decision. Even if the affected classes do not get
satisfaction from arbitration, the courts can and will consider
any claims under Title VII in a trial de novo.43
When such a case is brought to court, the proviso of §
703(h) exempting bona fide seniority systems should be nar-
rowly construed to extend only to those systems which are not
110 Kovarsky, Current Remedies for Discriminatory Effects of Seniority
Agreements, 24 VAND. L. REV. 683, 696 (1971). See also Gould, Seniority and the Black
Worker: Reflections on Quarles and Its Implications, 47 TEx. L. REv. 1039 (1969).
"I Krislov, Adams & Lairson, Plantwide Seniority, Black Employment and Em-
ployment Affirmative Action, 26 IND. & LABOR REL. REV. 686 (1972-73).
"4 See Comment, supra note 86.
, The submission of a claim to the NLRB does not preclude its later submission
to the courts under Title VII. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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the result of an intent to discriminate. That is, a seniority
system should be considered bona fide only if it has not been
engrafted upon past discriminatory hiring practices. To hold
otherwise, where women and minorities have been deprived of
an opportunity to accumulate working time equal to that of
white males, would mean that the white men who enjoy pre-
ferred positions over women and blacks would forever be
ahead of women and minorities, who would once again go to the
"foot of the line," ' thus rendering the goal of equal employ-
ment for all wholly illusory, and Title VII little more than a
paper fantasy.
Rebecca Westerfield
"' Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 358 (5th Cir. 1972).
